The idea to attack near Kursk and cut off the protrusion of the Soviet front that had formed here came to Hitler and his military even during the Wehrmacht's counteroffensive near Kharkov in February-March 1943. This counteroffensive showed that the German army was still capable of intercepting the strategic initiative. In addition, the Soviet command was afraid to repeat their mistake in the spring of 1942, when attempts to attack first led to a heavy defeat near Kharkov, which determined the unsuccessful course of the entire summer campaign of 1942. The Red Army has so far been very bad at conducting an offensive in the summer.
At the suggestion of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, this time, it was supposed to give the initiative of offensive actions to the enemy in advance, wear him out with stubborn defense and, after the heavy losses he had suffered, go into a counterattack. That the Germans would advance precisely near Kursk was no secret to anyone.
This plan provoked objections from the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, who was to repel a German attack south of Kursk. In his opinion, it was inappropriate to give the initiative to the enemy. The state of the Soviet troops and the balance of forces at the front made it possible to go for an assault. Waiting for a German strike meant, Vatutin believed, wasting time. Vatutin offered to strike the Germans first if they did not go over to the offensive before the beginning of July. Stalin instructed the commander of the Central and Reserve (Steppe) Fronts K.K. Rokossovsky and R. Ya. Malinovsky to present his views on this issue. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky defended the previously proposed plan. The Soviet offensive was to begin only after the German was thwarted.
The Battle of Kursk is the largest tank battle of the Second World War. It happened on July 12, 1943 at the Kursk Bulge near Prokhorovka. The battle was bloody, more than 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it on both sides. It was this battle that largely predetermined the outcome of all hostilities near Kursk and Orel in the summer of 1943, which led to a strategic turning point in World War II.
The battle consisted of two stages - defensive and offensive.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme Command Headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. For the offensive, the fascist German command attracted the troops of Army Groups Center (G. Kluge) and South (E. Manstein), concentrating in them 70% of tank divisions and over 65% of combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front. The enemy grouping consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. Important place in the enemy's plan was the massive use of new tanks and self-propelled guns.
The first stage was the Kursk strategic defensive operation on July 5-23, 1943. The operation was carried out by the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts. In the course of hostilities, the administrations of the Steppe Front, the 27th, 47th and 53rd combined arms, the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Air Armies, five tank and one mechanized corps, 19 divisions and one brigade were additionally introduced. The duration of the operation is 19 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 550 km. The depth of the withdrawal of Soviet troops is 12-35 km. In terms of its scope and intensity, the Kursk defensive operation is one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts bled and then stopped the offensive of the shock groups of the German fascist army and created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv directions. Hitler's plan to defeat the Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was completely ruined.
The second stage: Oryol strategic offensive operation ("Kutuzov") 12 July - 18 August 1943 and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ("Rumyantsev") 3 - 23 August 1943
The Oryol operation was carried out by the troops of the Bryansk, Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front. In the course of the offensive, the administrations of the 11th combined-arms, 3rd guards and 4th tank armies, five tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps, and 11 divisions were additionally introduced. The duration of the operation is 38 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 150 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations 4-5 km; tank and mechanized formations 7-10 km. During the offensive, Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German Army Group Center, liberated a significant territory from the invaders, including the regional center of Orel. With the elimination of the enemy's Oryol bridgehead, from which he launched an offensive on Kursk, the situation in the central sector of the Soviet-German front changed dramatically, and broad opportunities opened up for the development of an offensive in the Bryansk direction and for Soviet troops to enter the eastern regions of Belarus.
The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was carried out by the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. In the course of the offensive, the administrations of the 4th Guards, 47th and 57th armies, a tank and mechanized corps, 19 divisions and two brigades were additionally introduced. The duration of the operation is 21 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 300-400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 140 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations - 7 km, tank and mechanized formations - 10-15 km. During the operation, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated the powerful Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping, liberated the Kharkov industrial region, the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Favorable conditions were created for the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine. Only in the Prokhorovka area, where the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II took place on July 12, the enemy lost 400 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed. As a result of the counteroffensive, the enemy groupings were defeated in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, over 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. His offensive strategy was completely defeated. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. This battle and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the course of the war.
BATTLE KURSKAYA: FIGURES AND FACTS
The general balance of forces and means of the opposing sides by the beginning of July 1943
The composition of the Voronezh Front on July 5, 1943
Commander - General of the Army N.F. Vatutin
In the first echelon of the front, the 38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards armies were deployed. In the second echelon were the 1st Tank and 69th Armies, in the reserve were the 35th Guards Rifle, the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps and artillery, anti-aircraft units and formations. The Oboyan direction was covered by the 6th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General Chistyakov I.M.) consisting of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (71, 67, 90 Guards Rifle Division), 23 Guards Rifle Corps (51, 52, 89 Guards Rifle Division, 375 sd). The Korochanskoe direction was covered by the 7th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General Shumilov M.S.) consisting of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps (15, 36, 72 Guards Rifle Division), 25th Guards Rifle Corps (73, 78, 81 Guards Rifle Division, 213 sd)
Composition of the Steppe Military District by the beginning of the battle
Commander Colonel-General I. Konev
4th and 5th Guards, 27, 47, 53rd Combined Arms Army, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, as well as one rifle, three tank, three mechanized and three cavalry corps. In total: soldiers and officers - 573 thousand people, guns and mortars - 7401, tanks and self-propelled guns - 1551, aircraft - more than 500.
Losses of the Voronezh Front in a defensive operation
According to the combat report of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front No. 01398 to the Chief of the General Staff about losses from 4 to 22 July: killed - 20 577, missing - 25 898, total irrecoverable human losses - 46 504, wounded - 54 427, total human losses - 100 931. Equipment was irretrievably lost: tanks and self-propelled guns - 1 628, guns and mortars - 3 609, aircraft - 387 (with knocked out).
Soviet troops (Voronezh and Steppe fronts) as of August 3, 1943
Soldiers and officers - 980,500 people; guns and mortars - 12,000 pieces; tanks and self-propelled guns - 2,400 units; aircraft - 1,300 units.
List of units and formations that participated in the liberation of Belgorod on 08/05/1943.
89 Guards Rifle Division, 305, 375 Rifle Division 48sk, 93, 94 Guards Rifle Division, 96 tbr 35 sk, 10 OIPTABR. 26 ZENAD, 315 Guards Mineral Regiment 69A IIIsd 49sk 7 Guards A 19 Mechanized Brigade, 37 Mbr, 35 Mbr, 218 Tbr I Mechanized Corps 53A 16 Artillery Division of the breakthrough RGK 302 IAD and 264 IAD 4 Fighter Air Corps; I Guards bad and 293 bad I bomber air corps; 266 shad, 203 shad, 292 shad I assault air corps 5 VA 23 guards. long-range air regiment.
German fascist troops
The composition of the units of Army Group "South" allocated to the grouping for the offensive on Kursk
48th Panzer Corps and 2 SS Panzer Corps of 4th Panzer Army; army group "Kempf" consisting of 11, 42 army corps, 3 tank corps. In total, 14 divisions were involved, including 8 tank and one motorized, and the commander of GA Yug also had: 503 separate battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger", 39 tank regiment "Panthers", 228 and 911 separate divisions of assault guns. The total number of the grouping: 440,000 soldiers and officers, up to 4,000 guns and mortars, 1,408 tanks and assault guns (including 200 "Panthers" and 102 "Tigers"), about 1050 aircraft.
Losses of Army Group South from 5 to 17 July 1943
The 4th TA and AG "Kempf" lost from 4 to 23 July about 40,000 killed, wounded and missing. During the period from 5 to 17 July, more than 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns were damaged, 190 vehicles were irretrievably lost (including 6 Tigers and 44 Panthers). 1,200 guns and mortars were disabled.
Fascist German forces (4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf) as of August 3, 1943
Soldiers and officers - 200,000 people; guns and mortars - 3,000; tanks and self-propelled guns - 600 pieces; Aircraft - 1,000 units.
PROKHOROVSKY BATTLE - LEGEND AND REALITY
Karl-Heinz Frizer - military historian
(Germany)
A) Soviet encirclement plan.
The Red Army made qualitative progress during the first two years of the war. But the initial stage of the Battle of Kursk demonstrated how much the Wehrmacht was tactically more competent. At the strategic level, however, she managed to create a real masterpiece even before the first tactical actions began. This was expressed not only in the concealment from German intelligence of individual armies and entire army groups in the depths of space. This was, for example, the Steppe Front as a strategic reserve. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most outstanding examples of camouflage to deceive the enemy in the course of a war.
The use of strategic reserves was planned only at the beginning of the Soviet offensive in the summer, in order to bury the German troops defeated in defensive battles near Kursk like an avalanche. But when the Voronezh Front was threatened with collapse, a few days later this avalanche was set in motion - in the direction of Prokhorovka. This was supposed not only to stop the German fascist invaders, but to "surround and destroy" the three German tank corps that had rushed forward. The Supreme High Command of the Red Army wanted not an "ordinary victory," but a "crushing victory," that is, "Cannes" is a kind of tank Stalingrad.
The front line almost facilitated the pincer operation of the 4th Panzer Army, which was advancing to the north. In front of the massive armored wedges, however, there was a long, narrow corridor suitable for flanking. Vatutin, in accordance with the Operational Plan of the Headquarters, developed a plan of attack in four directions - on both flanks of the tank armies to create shock groups in the Yakovlevo-Bykovka direction to threaten the rear of the 48th Panzer Corps and 2 SS Panzer Corps. In addition, counter attacks were planned by combined-arms armies. According to this plan, the German tank corps, unaware of the trap, were to be attacked from four directions:
From the west, by the forces of the 1st tank army (6th and 41st tank corps, as well as the 3rd mechanized and 5th guards tank corps),
From the northwest by the forces of the 6th Guards Army,
From the northeast by the forces of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front,
From the east - by forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front (XVIII-XXIX tank corps and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps), reinforced by 2 tank and 2 guards tank corps, as well as other independent formations.
The situation was no better for the Kempf Task Force located southeast of 3 Panzer Corps. According to Vatutin's plan, the Soviet 7th Guards Army was to strike the corps in the flank in the Razumnoye area (Belgorod direction). The decisive day of the Battle of Kursk, in the opinion of the Soviet Headquarters, was July 12. On this day, in the north of the Kursk salient, the Bryansk Front and most of forces of the Western Front. As the front collapsed, Model's 9th Army stopped its advance on Kursk.
On the same day, a devastating blow was planned against the attacking formations of Army Group South. The powerful forces were represented by the 5th Guards Tank Army, which had a total of 909 tanks and 42 assault guns. This army was tasked with stopping the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the battle near Prokhorovka.
B) Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality
The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, which was actually decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Presumably, the leading edge of the entire course of World War II was a wide isthmus between the Psel River and railway station Prokhorovka not far from Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a confined space. From the Soviet point of view, this was a collision of two mobile avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks versus 750-800 German ones. On 12 July, 400 German tanks were destroyed and the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."
The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which suffered the greatest losses on July 12 in its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself before Stalin, he composed the legend of the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.
“By chance, at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the turmoil, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at a short distance on the sides or rear where the ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive near Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on 12 July. The Battle of Kursk tore out the heart of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success throughout the war. "
In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In the "largest tank battle in history", "two armored formations with the most complex structure clashed with each other in open close combat on an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.
What was the real battle of Prokhorovka?
First, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on 12 July 1943 could not lose 300 or (like Rotmistrov's) 400 tanks;
In total, in the entire operation "Citadel", its total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which can be clearly seen from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops, without even losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;
In addition, Rotmistrov's statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five took part in the hostilities in the Prokhorovka area. In total, as part of the 2 SS Panzer Corps by the decree of July 12, a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) were in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Death's Head" advanced north that day, above the Psel River, 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 fighters, as well as another 186 combat vehicles, had to resist the 5th Guards Tank Army.
Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12, and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and took the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to the reserve and gave him about 100 tanks to defend his left flank from the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht advancing from the south. The battle involved 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions against 672 Soviet ones. The operational plan of Rotmistrov can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:
The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast on the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte". It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one stretch of 3 kilometers to maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th tank corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th tank corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 assault guns of the Leibstandart. The superiority of the Russians was approximately fivefold.
At the same time, another blow was to be inflicted on the flank of the Germans at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was advancing, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to act against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.
In addition, one should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially about the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to the reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army also operated, for example, the 9th Guards Airborne Division. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area, the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside the armor were minimal. Soviet counterattacks were supported by two air armies, while the German side, only sporadically, could count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the 9th Army's offensive zone.
In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, beginning on 5 July, the soldiers were in continuous fighting and were experiencing serious supply difficulties. Now they have found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a renowned tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by the Russian troops, a distinctive feature of which was massive avalanche attacks without taking into account losses. The overwhelming numerical superiority was not the only cause for concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance, and did not react at all to danger. What role vodka played in the hostilities on the Eastern Front was not a secret for the Germans; in Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a fierce attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the incomprehensible events that took place at altitude 252.2. For the rest, it was a complete surprise. This was an outstanding achievement of Rotmistrov and his staff - to quickly and unnoticed bring an armada of tanks and other Vehicle... This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march of 330-380 km. German intelligence did indeed expect a counterattack, but not of this magnitude.
The day of July 11 ended with a local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with crossing the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept the height of 252.2 in a "giant wave". Having occupied the height, Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where he encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". An even more dangerous situation developed on the left wing, which was almost suspended in the air.
Commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left)
assigns a task to the commander of the artillery of the SS division Dead Head SS Brigadefuehrer Priss
Since the attack of the motorized SS division Death's Head was not in the east, but rather in the north, the shock wedges parted. A rift was created that was monitored by Leibstandart's intelligence department, but hardly controlled by it. An enemy strike along Psela could have fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, Leibstandart was instructed to stop the enemy's advance.
2 SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the tangible influence of the entire artillery of the corps, was followed by the blow of the "Dead's Head" division at the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River, the other two units could continue their attack. Leibstandart's formations were attacking separately. The 1st SS motorized regiment operated on the right southern wing of the railway embankment, to the left, closer to the height of 252.2, the 2nd SS motorized regiment operated. The tank regiment was redeployed to the bridgehead behind Hill 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one heavy tank battalion with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the Das Reich division's zone of operations.
It is necessary to note the following bright moment - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army of 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. It is also a legend, the fact that on the morning of July 12, two tank armada met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights in armor.
According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 am (8:30 am Moscow time), the attacks of Leibstandart's tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a decent answer, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".
At the forefront at this time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment was operating, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Piper, who became known later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).
Joachim Piper
The day before, his compound had occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene took place: “We were almost all asleep when, with the support of aviation, they suddenly threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other. " The first German tanker who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of Reich Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)
Rudolph von Ribbentrop
When he looked up to Hill 252.2 this morning, he saw a purple flare, which meant "Attention Tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the moat, he went with seven Panzer IV tanks from his company to attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column marching towards him. “Having passed 100-200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40 appeared in front of us, and then just an uncountable number of Russian T-34s. Now this wall of tanks was coming towards us. Car after car, wave after wave, incredible pressure, at maximum speed was on us. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, and the other three tanks escaped. "
At that moment, the 29th Panzer Corps under the leadership of Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the forces of the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies, which were standing in the lowlands and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the attack by the kamikaze, which the Russians were forced to go to. If the Russian tanks continued to break through, this would be followed by the collapse of the German front. "
However, in a matter of minutes, everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was the incredible Soviet imprudence. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles 2 meters deep were dug by Soviet sappers below the 252.2 level along the entire line of the German - and now the Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: "All the new T-34s went up the hill, and then picked up speed and fell into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us." Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he was able to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented a convenient target for encirclement, most of their tanks were shot. It was Hell of fire, smoke, killed and wounded, as well as burning T-34! " - he wrote.
On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no "shooting at a moving target". Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were on the left flank of the division, entered the battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack until noon in order to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank graveyard. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.
As can be seen from the material and technical documentation of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes.
According to the latest information from the Russians, only the 29th Panzer Corps lost 172 out of 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were irretrievably lost. In manpower losses amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 dead and missing.
While at the height of 252.2, the frontal attack of the 19th Panzer Corps was repelled, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its climax. Here, the offensive of the units of Major General Bakharov's 18th Panzer Corps, advancing in the Psel River area by forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of units of front-line subordination, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks " Churchill ".
The commander of the 18th Panzer Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov
From the German point of view, this surprise attack was the worst case scenario, namely, to strike at the previously described gap between the motorized SS divisions "Death's Head" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Panzer Corps penetrated deep into enemy positions almost unhindered. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle disintegrated into many separate battles, in which it was difficult to determine "who was attacking and who was defending."
Commander of the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" division, SS Oberfuehrer Theodor Wisch
Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its climax. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive, along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank knocked out the T-34 tank of the battalion commander of the guard, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.
Senior lieutenant (during the Battle of Kursk, captain) P.A. Skripkin,
the commander of the 1st tank battalion 181 tbr 18 mk with his daughter Galya. 1941 g.
This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: "The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a blazing fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German one at full speed. The explosion shook the earth. The courage of the Soviet tankers shocked the Germans, and they retreated. "
Tankman Alexander Nikolaev
This episode became business card Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on art canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The driver mechanic of the allegedly exploded "Tiger" Scharführer Georg Lezsch describes the events as follows: "In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks under the protection of a small forest attacked us with a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, rushed towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning bulk of metal, marching towards me with great speed. " The attack of the 18th Panzer Corps was repulsed with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.
The attack of Soviet troops in the south-east of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcements. They were opposed by the 25th tank brigade of the 19th tank corps, supported by the 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 28th Guards airborne regiment and part of the formations of the 169th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps.
To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoe, located on the left wing.
The most significant successes were achieved on 12 July by the motorized SS division "Death's Head", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with General Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks were operating on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked from there to the north. Despite the losses incurred, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to overturn Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area there were some infantry units that operated as part of the 6th SS motorized regiment. They stayed on south bank to provide a reserve.
SS Gruppenfuehrer Max Simon - Commander of the "Death's Head" Division
Also incorrect is Rotmistrov's assertion that he launched an offensive on the "Dead's Head" position on July 12 with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on the offensive to the north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these units were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.
The "Dead's Head" division at that time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Panzer Corps. By mid-afternoon, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which caused Rotmistrov's nervousness. He was afraid of losing control of his formations because of the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost offensive became the symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and crowded together for defense, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and threw back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, which made the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.
(To be continued)
Translation from German language performed by a researcher of the ONER A.S. Kadira
The Battle of Kursk (aka the Battle of the Kursk Bulge) is the largest and most key battle during the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. It was attended by 2 million people, 6 thousand tanks and 4 thousand aircraft.
The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days and consisted of three operations:
- Kursk strategic defensive (July 5 - 23);
- Orlovskaya (July 12 - August 18);
- Belgorod-Kharkiv (3 - 23 August).
The councils involved:
- 1.3 million people + there were 0.6 million in the reserve;
- 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve;
- 19100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve;
- 2,172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve.
Fought on the side of the Third Reich:
- 900 thousand people;
- 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair);
- 10 thousand guns;
- 2050 aircraft.
Source: toboom.name
This battle claimed many lives. But a lot of military equipment "sailed away" to the next world. In honor of the 73rd anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, we recall which tanks then fought.
T-34-76
Another modification of the T-34. Armor:
- forehead - 45 mm;
- board - 40 mm.
Cannon - 76 mm. The T-34-76 was the most massive tank that participated in the Battle of Kursk (70% of all tanks).
Source: lurkmore.to
Light tank, aka "firefly" (jargon from WoT). Armor - 35-15 mm, gun - 45 mm. The number on the battlefield is 20-25%.
Source: warfiles.ru
A heavy vehicle with a 76mm drone, named after the Russian revolutionary and Soviet military leader Klim Voroshilov.
Source: mirtankov.su
KV-1S
He is "Kvass". High-speed modification of the KV-1. "High-speed" implies a reduction in armor for the sake of increasing the tank's maneuverability. This does not make it easier for the crew.
Source: wiki.warthunder.ru
SU-152
Heavy self-propelled artillery unit, built on the basis of the KV-1S, armed with a 152-mm howitzer. In the Kursk Bulge, there were 2 regiments, that is, 24 pieces.
Source: worldoftanks.ru
SU-122
Medium-weight self-propelled gun with a 122 mm pipe. 7 regiments, that is, 84 units, were thrown into the “execution near Kursk”.
Source: vspomniv.ru
Churchill
On the side of the Soviets, the Lend-Lease “Churchillies” also fought - no more than a couple of dozen. The armor of the animals is 102-76 mm, the cannon is 57 mm.
Source: tanki-v-boju.ru
Ground armored vehicles of the Third Reich
Full name - Panzerkampfwagen III. Popularly - PzKpfw III, Panzer III, Pz III. Medium tank with 37mm cannon. Armor - 30-20 mm. Nothing special.
