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The Battle of Kursk in terms of its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After her, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge - is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the Stalingrad and Kursk battles two of the most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article, we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance in the course of the war, as well as its reasons, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk can hardly be overestimated. If it were not for the exploits of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again moving to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and the latter lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 has forever become the Day of Russian Military Glory. In addition, during the battles, the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history took place, as well as a huge amount of aviation and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of the critical importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place earlier than the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans for the quick capture of the USSR. According to the "Barbarossa" plan and the "blitzkrieg" tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union rallied and was able to throw a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, according to historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers died, more than half a million were wounded. At the same time, it is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the sides in the Battle of Kursk, possibly much more significant. Basically, foreign historians speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany was played by Soviet intelligence, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began to receive messages about this operation at the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its implementation, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had failed to do its job. Probably, the Germans would still have managed to break through the Russian defenses, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they were preparing for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

On this moment historians are not sure exactly who delivered this vital knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that information about the plans of the German command was given by the scouts of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian scout Sandor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about Operation Citadel was transmitted to Moscow by one of the most famous scouts of the Second World War - Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland.

Substantial support to the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz encryption machine, through which messages were transmitted between members of the highest leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept plans for a summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod areas, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would proceed. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to adequately prepare for it, so as not to leave the Germans a chance of victory.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive actions, which led to the formation of a bulge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was named "Kursk Bulge". In April, it became clear to both sides that soon one of the key battles would begin for this ledge, capable of deciding the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

There was no consensus at the German headquarters. For a long time Hitler could not work out an exact strategy of action for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to start an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced military leader of the Reich (Manchetein) was against, Hitler nevertheless agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 is a chance for the Union to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation was treated with a previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin knew about the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in the infantry, tanks, guns and aviation. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications for their meeting and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then launch a counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, after two years of hostilities, were still able to work out the tactics and strategy of waging war of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed even before it began.

The plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a large offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel"... To destroy the Soviet defenses, the Germans decided to inflict descending blows from the north (area of ​​the city of Orel) and from the south (area of ​​the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans had to unite in the area of ​​the city of Kursk, thus, having completely encircled the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts. In addition, the German tank units were to turn in an eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and help to get out of the encirclement. This tactic was not at all new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using this tactic, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia, 50 divisions with a total strength of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of panzer divisions were commonplace for the Germans. The Wehrmacht forces have always used lightning attacks from tank units to prevent the enemy from even a chance to group up and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before they could fight.

The commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht was General Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and General Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by General Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were commanded by General Hermann Goth.

The German army received long-awaited tank reserves before the start of the battle. Hitler sent to the Eastern Front more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elephant (Elephant) tank destroyers.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" were among the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers had already seen and learned to fight against them, then the "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" brought many problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers were medium tanks that were slightly inferior in armor to the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired at long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-ACS), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its number was small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, since at that time it possessed almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was highly vulnerable to the infantry, which could get close to it and blow up them. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. Weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot sub-caliber projectiles. The most vulnerable place in the protection of a tank is a weak suspension, which was disabled, and then captured by a stationary tank.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth noting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already irrelevant at that time.

During the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Panzer Army included the elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division Adolf Hitler, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (she the same "Dead Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In terms of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice inferior to the Soviet one, and some sources point to a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding off the massive advance of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive at the most unfavorable moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive generals of the army - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern face of the Kursk salient. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native of the Voronezh Region, General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders the task of defending the southern face of the ledge lay. Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky were in charge of coordinating the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from on the side of Germany. It is estimated that the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including troops from the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht soldiers did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times inferior to 2.5 thousand against less than 5 thousand. As a result, the ratio of forces before the Battle of Kursk looked as follows: 2: 1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic War Alexei Isaev says that the size of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since it does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of soldiers of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations numbered more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before you give Full description events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show the map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows a diagram of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how the military units acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk, you will also see legend that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans soon faced resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front in order to provide a response artillery barrage, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern faces. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare a defense. Manstein told Hitler more than once that this offensive no longer made sense at the moment. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try to first repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern face, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked slightly west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. The solid defense resulted in heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break through 10 kilometers deep. On the southern face, the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans could not break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht's elite armored divisions hardly advanced. As soon as it became clear that the German forces could not break through on the northern and southern faces, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the Prokhorovka direction.

On July 11, fierce battles began near the village of Prokhorovka, which grew into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the Germans, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted its offensive potential and decided to go over to the defensive.

Tank battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks were involved on both sides, as the data from various sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks in the USSR reached about 1,000 vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

A tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions advanced in the west, with about 300 more tanks moving in from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, as the rising sun shone on the Germans directly into the observation devices of the tanks. The battle formations of the sides quickly mixed up and within a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult situation, since the main strength of their tanks was in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation maneuverability was a lot. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated at Kursk. The Russian tanks, on the other hand, gained an advantage, since they had a chance to target the weak spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (this is especially true of the famous T-34).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff with their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form order.

While the bulk of the tank forces were tied up in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack, the tank reserves of the Red Army had to be used. In the southern direction, already by 14.00, Soviet troops began to crowd out German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

The losses of tanks on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation were as follows:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irrecoverable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly higher. For example, the Germans after the Battle of Prokhorovka had only 1/10 of fully combat-ready vehicles.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier, also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 pieces of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 pieces.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the Union's tank units, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the Germans' tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight with tanks." Most of the tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and drained of blood, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks that took part in the battle at Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed, or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95: 1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops were destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops entered the line they had occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went into deep defense.

In the course of the Battle of Kursk, a radical change took place. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army began a counteroffensive on the Kursk Bulge. From 17 to 23 July, Soviet troops carried out the Izyum-Barvenkovo ​​offensive operation.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the enemy's Donbass grouping so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. In spite of the fact that the enemy threw in some of his best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to seize bridgeheads and with powerful blows forge and encircle the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front greatly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miusskaya offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Miuss offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull back fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant air forces and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​the city of Orel, where two German armies confronted the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans could not hold the bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Oryol was liberated by the forces of the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Eagle was an extremely important task for the Red Army, with which it successfully coped.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive stage began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was named Rumyantsev. The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts.

Already two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the August 11 offensive, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway line of the Germans. Despite all the counterattacks by the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The battle for the Kursk Bulge had already been won by the Soviet troops at that moment. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order "to stand to the last."

The Mginsky offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the plan of the German offensive against Leningrad, prevent the enemy from shifting forces to the west and completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the sides at the beginning of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite the strong artillery barrage, the German army offered fierce resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy's defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack the German positions. Thanks to the numerical advantage and powerful mortar fire, the soldiers of the USSR managed to capture the enemy's defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded beyond the Sinyaevo and Sinyaevsky heights, which several times were captured by Soviet troops, and then they went back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and go over to a defensive defense. Thus, the Mginsky offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repulse this attack, the Germans had to use reserves that were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk in 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to contain the Soviet troops. To weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of the aid of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, since in its course the liberation of Belarus began. However, most importantly, the commanders of the Battle of Kursk succeeded in pinning down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the enemy's positions near Kursk, the forces of the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties' plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German group in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the forces of the Red Army met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in battles he showed himself from all the regiments of the 67th. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, but the Donbass offensive operation continued - the spacecraft forces had to push the enemy back across the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich still allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino, or as the city is now called, Donetsk, was taken.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, the German soldiers actively used the scorched earth tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages, as well as small towns on his way. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating in cities, the Germans plundered everything they could get their hands on.

On September 22, the Germans managed to be pushed back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbass offensive operation came to its end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All of the above operations led to the fact that the forces of the Wehrmacht, as a result of the hostilities in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of the commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally consolidated the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War will be for the USSR. Germany's allies understood this, too, and they began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that time was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive in Sicily and Italian troops surrendered to British and American forces with little or no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to hold Western Europe, he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and go into deep defense across the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the KV-1 armor. German tank crews tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hooked up a KV-1 and started towing it. About halfway, the KV-1 engine suddenly started up and a Soviet tank dragged two PzIVs with it to its base. The German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After the report (message) on the victory in the Battle of Kursk came to Stalin's table, the general secretary said that this was only the beginning and very soon the troops of the Red Army would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kiev, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR... A report to the US president in August said the USSR was now dominant in World War II. There is proof of this. If for the defense of Sicily from the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States Germany allocated only two divisions, then on the Eastern Front the USSR riveted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was deeply concerned about the success of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a "second front" would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit for itself. Consequently, the opening of the "second front" should follow as soon as possible, while US assistance was required at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel led to the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which had already been prepared for execution. A victory at Kursk would have allowed to develop an offensive against Leningrad, and then the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's prestige among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and British to deploy in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat for Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and withdrew from the war. Thus, Hitler lost his loyal ally.

Success, of course, came at a high price. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as well as the German ones. The balance of forces has already been shown above - now it is worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since the data from different sources differ greatly. Many historians take average figures - this is 200 thousand deaths and three times more wounded. The least optimistic data indicate more than 800 thousand deaths from both sides and the same number of injured. The parties also lost a huge amount of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4 thousand units from both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German one - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5: 1 or 4: 1 according to various sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, one can conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to the German ones, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers at Kursk displayed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best military leader of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards “For participation in the Battle of Kursk”.

One more interesting fact- children also took part in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front lines, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to consolidate all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• 5 - 23 July 1943 –Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 –Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - a bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Izium-Barvenkovo ​​offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Miusskaya offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• 3 - 23 August 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginsky offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Arc of Fire:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to capture the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which reduced the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

On August 23, the Day of Military Glory of Russia is celebrated - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge. Almost two months of intense and bloody battles led to this important victory for the Red Army, the outcome of which was not at all a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember it in more detail.

Fact 1

The protrusion in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February – March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of the Kursk Bulge

Fact 2

The Battle of the Kursk Bulge is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the battles that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. The victory in this battle marked the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. And this means that we were advancing from now on. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November-December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a difficult choice for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if you attack, how large-scale tasks should you set yourself? One way or another, both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent his report to Headquarters on possible military operations for the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defenses, destroying as many tanks as possible, and then introduce reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge was discovered.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was the creation of a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense in the most likely sectors of the German offensive - on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient.

In a situation of a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to keep the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler designated the tasks of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. So, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops were intent on advancing decisively.

Building defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of the German strikes, mistakes were inevitable given such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Stavka believed that a stronger grouping would advance in the Orel region against the Central Front. In reality, however, the southern grouping, which operated against the Voronezh front, turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the German command's plan to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies on the Kursk ledge. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the north from the Orel region and from the south from the Belgorod region. Impact wedges were to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Gotha's tank corps in the direction of Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspecting the wrecked "Tiger"

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the largest in terms of the number of tanks involved was the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23-30), 1941. It happened on Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides converged near Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual novelty is the Goliath tankette. This self-propelled tracked mine without a crew was remotely controlled by wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these tankettes were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, in the center of the Soviet-German front, a ledge up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide was formed, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation code-named "Citadel" was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the German-fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go over to the defense on the Kursk Bulge and, during a defensive battle, bleed the enemy's shock groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. ...

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping numbered, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme Command headquarters created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commanded by General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern face of the Kursk salient, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) defended the southern face. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of a rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an offensive against Kursk from the regions of Orel and Belgorod. From the Oryol side, the grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from the side of Belgorod - the grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of Army Group South).

The task of repelling the offensive from the direction of Orel was assigned to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - the battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Operational Group Kempf) and the Soviet forces counterstriking. Up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle on both sides. The fierce battle lasted all day, in the evening the tank crews, along with the infantry, fought hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and Left Wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the enemy's Oryol grouping. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy's defenses on the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol axes and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as by long-range aviation, by 23 August 1943 threw the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km, liberated Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 elite divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

Tank counterattack. A still from the movie Liberation: Arc of Fire. 1968

There is silence over the Prokhorovka field. Only from time to time is the bell toll heard, calling the parishioners to the service in the Church of Peter and Paul, which was built on public donations in memory of the soldiers who died at the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoye, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melekhovo ... These names hardly say anything to the younger generation now. And 70 years ago a terrible battle was raging here, in the Prokhorovka area the largest oncoming tank battle unfolded. Everything that could burn was burning, everything was covered with dust, smoke and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The ground was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Head-to-head here met the Soviet guards and the elite of the Wehrmacht - the SS tank divisions.
Before the Prokhorovka tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the zone of the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most acute moments.
But the largest scale was taken by tank battles in the zone of the Voronezh Front. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Panzer Army and the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Germans clashed with three corps of the 1st Panzer Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards separate tank corps.
"LET'S LET'S LONG IN KURSK!"
The fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when German units attempted to shoot down the outposts in the 6th Guards Army's zone.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning of July 5, when the Germans launched the first massive blow with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenfuehrer Josef Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and an officer shouted to him: "Let's have lunch in Kursk!"
But the SS men did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the 6th Army's defensive zone. The exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to refresh themselves with dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, Operational Group Kempf crossed the river. Seversky Donets and struck at the 7th Guards Army.
Gerhard Niemann, Tiger shooter of the 503rd heavy tank battalion of the 3rd Panzer Corps: “Another anti-tank gun 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew runs in panic, except for one person. He falls to the sight and shoots. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuvers - and another cannon is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time at the stern of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to run. "
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Panzer Army took the main blow. For several hours of battle, only numbers remained from its 538th and 1008th anti-tank fighter regiments, as they say. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the area between Syrtsevo and Yakovlev on a front of five to six kilometers, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army, Goth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive strike of aviation and artillery.
Commander of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the crack and climbed a small hill where the command post was equipped. It was half past three in the afternoon. But it seemed like a solar eclipse had come. The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots were visible, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and caterpillars clattered. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving damaged and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and went on the attack again. "
By the end of July 8, the Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, withdrew to the second army line of defense.
300 KILOMETER MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite violent protests from the commander of the Steppe Front I.S. Konev. Stalin ordered the 5th Guards Tank Army to move to the rear of the 6th and 7th Guards armies, as well as to strengthen the Voronezh Front with the 2nd Tank Corps.
In the 5th Guards Tank Army, there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including medium tanks T-34-501, and light T-70-261. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march was carried out around the clock under the cover of aviation of the 2nd Air Army.
The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov: “At 8 o'clock in the morning it got hot and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon, dust was thickly covering the roadside bushes, wheat fields, tanks and trucks, the dark red disc of the sun barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulling the cannons), armored infantry vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The faces of the soldiers were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. The heat was unbearable. The soldiers were thirsty, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, clung to their bodies. It was especially difficult for the driver-mechanics on the march. The tank crews tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone replaced the drivers, and on short halts they were allowed to sleep. "
The aviation of the 2nd Air Army covered the 5th Guards Tank Army so reliably on the march that German intelligence did not manage to detect its arrival. After passing 200 km, the army arrived in the area south-west of Stary Oskol on the morning of 8 July. Then, having put in order the material part, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer rush and by the end of July 9, strictly at the appointed time, concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky.
MACHINE CHANGES DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle broke out on the Oboyan and Korochansk directions. The main feature of the struggle on this day was that the Soviet troops, repelling the massive attacks of the enemy, themselves began to inflict strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Panzer Army.
As in previous days, the most fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Great Germany", 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by separate companies and battalions of "Tigers" and "Ferdinands", attacked. Units of the 1st Panzer Army again bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce battles continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochansk direction, where by the end of the day the army group "Kempf" broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned out by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group that had settled there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians settled in the system of trenches, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and offered fanatical resistance. "
On the morning of July 9, a German strike group of several hundred tanks with massive aviation support resumed the offensive in a 10-kilometer sector. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochansk direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway to the east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main blow, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce struggle on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. A wide strip of heights stretches from the Prokhorovka area in the northwest direction, which dominate the adjacent terrain and are convenient for the actions of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group South was to deliver three powerful blows in a complex manner, which were supposed to lead to the encirclement and destruction of two groupings of Soviet troops and to the opening of an offensive to Kursk.
To develop the success, it was planned to bring in fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 from Donbass were urgently transferred to Kharkov. The beginning of the offensive on Kursk from the north and from the south was scheduled by the German command for the morning of 11 July.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat the enemy groupings advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorovka axes. The formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main grouping of SS tank divisions in the Prokhorov area. The start of the general counteroffensive was scheduled for the morning of 12 July.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than all, clearly expecting the diversion of the attention of the Soviet command to other directions, the main group - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, who was awarded the highest the award of the Third Reich "Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks from the SS Reich division managed to break through to the village of Storozhevoye, threatening the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown in. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main shock group of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on the front of only about 8 km, entered the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
Even less successes were achieved by the second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Great Germany", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. Our troops successfully repulsed their attacks.
However, to the north-east of Belgorod, where the army group "Kempf" was advancing, a threatening situation arose. The 6th and 7th tank divisions of the enemy broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 kilometers from the main grouping of SS Panzer Divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the army group "Kempf" part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to start the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation made it necessary to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROHOROVKA
At 8.30 on July 12, Soviet shock groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the 4th German Panzer Army. However, due to the breakthrough of the Germans to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops launched an attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: "Artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten anew."
Manstein threw all available forces to repel the attacks of Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the Soviet offensive could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike group of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle broke out on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 broke out on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikhino. This strip of terrain measuring up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth was captured by the enemy as a result of a tense struggle during 11 July. On the bridgehead, the main enemy grouping was deployed and operated as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand vehicles. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command inflicted its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from the Rotmistrov observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, with a head-on crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi forces, with a swift end-to-end attack literally piercing the enemy battle formation. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to meet such a large mass of our combat vehicles and such a decisive attack. Management in the forward units and subunits of the enemy was clearly disrupted. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they used at the beginning of the offensive in a collision with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield was swirling with smoke and dust, and the ground shook with powerful explosions. The tanks jumped at each other and, grappling, could no longer disperse, fought to the death, until one of them burst out with a torch or stopped with broken tracks. But the destroyed tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire. "
West of Prokhorovka, along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Panzer Corps went over to the offensive. His tank brigades upset the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps Yevgeny Shkurdalov: “I saw only what was, so to speak, within my tank battalion. Ahead of us was the 170th Tank Brigade. With great speed, it wedged into the location of the German tanks, the heavy ones, which were going in the first wave, and the German tanks pierced our tanks. The tanks were going very close to each other, and therefore they shot literally point-blank, simply shot each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes - sixty-five vehicles. "
Wilhelm Res, radio operator of the commander's tank of the tank division "Adolf Hitler": “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. On our site they were obstructed by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed they flew into this ditch, at the expense of their speed they overcame three or four meters in it, but then they seemed to freeze in a slightly inclined position with the cannon raised up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired at point-blank range. "
Evgeny Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the railroad, and literally at a distance of one hundred meters I saw the Tiger tank, which stood side-to-side and fired at our tanks. Apparently, he knocked out a lot of our cars, since the cars were going side by side to him, and he was firing at the sides of our cars. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile, fired. The tank caught fire. I fired another shot, the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I had no time for it. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out the T-III tank and the Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, you know, there was a feeling of delight that you see, I had done such a heroic deed. "
The 29th Panzer Corps, supported by units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railways and highways southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps combat log, the attack began without artillery treatment of the enemy's line and without air cover. This made it possible for the enemy to open concentrated fire on the combat formations of the corps and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tanks fire from the spot.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly, one T-34 broke through and headed straight for us. Our first radio operator began to feed me shells one at a time so that I could put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander at the top kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer and closer. And only after the fourth - "Shot" I heard: "Thank God!"
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower, as if stamped, he had 5-centimeter holes, located at the same distance from each other, as if they were measured with a compass. The battle formations of the sides were mixed. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy from close range, but they themselves suffered heavy losses. "
From the documents of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tigers' formation and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit the turret of its T -34 and the other pierced the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver Sergeant Nikolayev and radio operator Zyryanov. They took refuge in the crater, but still one of the "Tigers" noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and sent it straight to the Tiger. Both tanks exploded on impact. "
The blow of Soviet armor, new tanks with a full set of ammunition, thoroughly shook Hauser's divisions, exhausted in battles, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters in the Kursk Bulge area, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack south-west of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. "
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS Panzer Divisions "Dead Head" and "Adolf Hitler" to the northeast was thwarted, these divisions suffered such losses, after which they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Heavy losses were also suffered by units of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" from the attacks of units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the area of ​​the breakthrough of the army group "Kempf" south and southeast of Prokhorovka, a fierce struggle also continued throughout the day of July 12, as a result of which the attack of the army group "Kempf" to the north was stopped by tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army ...
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, to the headquarters of the 29th Panzer Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. In one place he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burned-out "Panther" rammed by a T-70 tank. A few dozen meters away stood the Tiger and T-34, grappling in a deadly embrace. “This is what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ dramatically in different sources. Manstein in his book "Lost Victories" writes that in total during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. In the collection "The classification is removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts", it is said about 1600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German tank losses was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book Citadel. Battle of Kursk ". If we shift his diagram into a table, then we get the following picture: (the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Panzer Army in the period July 4-17, 1943, see the table).
Kross's data are at variance with those from Soviet sources, which may be understandable to a certain extent. So, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce fighting that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (at Cross - 244).
But there are also completely incomprehensible discrepancies in the numbers. For example, aerial photography, made on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division "Great Germany" from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Cross, on July 7, 48th mk lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bomb-assault strikes on concentrated enemy forces (SS "Great Germany" and the 11th etc.) on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area around the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It burned German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots. According to Cross, on July 9, there were no losses at all in the 4th German Panzer Army, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubborn battles, overcoming fierce resistance of the Soviet troops. But it was by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the attack on Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about Cross's data for July 10 and 11, according to which there were no losses in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was on these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce battles, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that Sergeant M.F. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After the archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess the Soviet losses in the tank battle near Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps for July 12, of the 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th tank corps on 13.07.43, corps losses amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their original strength. Thus, you can get a more or less accurate figure of the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle near Prokhorovka against the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Death's Head" - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for the German losses at Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic discrepancy in numbers.
According to the testimony of Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and the destroyed military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, then in a small area southwest of Prokhorovka, where an oncoming tank battle unfolded on July 12, more than 400 broken and burned German tanks were counted. Rotmistrov in his memoirs stated that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed.
But in the late 1990s, the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser published sensational data that he obtained after studying German archives. According to this data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle at Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. So, in the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps it is said that the enemy's losses amounted to, including 68 tanks (it is interesting to note that this coincides with the data of Cross). In a combat report from the 33rd Guards Corps headquarters to the commander of the 5th Guards Army on July 13, 1943, it is said that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past day. It is further reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy removed their damaged tanks, the number of which exceeds 200. Several dozen destroyed enemy tanks were chalked up by the 18th Panzer Corps.
We can agree with Cross's assertion that it is generally difficult to calculate the losses of tanks, since the disabled vehicles were repaired and went into battle again. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the battle of Prokhorovka lost at least over 100 tanks (excluding the losses of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" operating south of Prokhorovka). All in all, according to Cross, the losses of the 4th German Panzer Army from 4 to 14 July amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916, which were at the beginning of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein's report, claims that between 5 and 13 July, the 4th German Panzer Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Panzer Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the sides in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of the Soviet troops against the 4th German Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, are estimated as follows. On the Soviet side, 500 were lost, on the German side - 300 tanks and self-propelled guns. Cross claims that after the Prokhorovka battle, Hauser's sappers blew up destroyed German equipment that could not be repaired and was stationed in a no-man's land. After August 1, such a quantity of faulty equipment accumulated in German repair shops in Kharkov and Bohodukhiv that for repair it had to be sent even to Kiev.
Of course, the greatest losses were suffered by the German Army Group South in the first seven days of the fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorov battle lies not even in the damage inflicted on the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers inflicted a powerful blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of history Soviet army with the German fascist invaders. The front in its configuration in the region near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command was preparing an offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I decided, as soon as the weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." The swift tanks "tigers" and "panthers" super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands" according to the plan of the Nazis were supposed to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The Military Council of the front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two twenty minutes, silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until 23 August.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into a defeat for the Hitlerite groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead - crushing blows using surprise at the forces of the Soviet Army, their encirclement and destruction. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the fulfillment of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Group "Center" and the "Kempf" task force of the armies "South", which came out from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were supposed to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulsion of the blow from the direction of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were to meet the advancing detachments from the side of Belgorod.

The steppe front, as part of the rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. July 12, 1943, the Russian field under railway station Prokhorovka, the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in scale, took place. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand human losses. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovskoye field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, launching Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From 16 to 18 July, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk triangle and began pursuing it with the support of the air forces. The combined forces of the Hitlerite formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk

• An unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key in the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the 1943 campaign plans;
• As a result of the implementation of the "Kutuzov" plan and the "Commander Rumyantsev" operation, units of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of ​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads were liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance westward, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Kursk battle

• The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Hitlerite company against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and the whole as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.