The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the Hokkaido Island (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.
The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Big Kuril and the Small Kuril (Habomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of Okhotsk from The Pacific.
The Great Kuril Ridge is 1200 km long and stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. On the southern islands there are forests, the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.
The Small Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.
The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin Region ( the Russian Federation). They are divided into three regions: Severo-Kurilskiy, Kurilskiy and Yuzhno-Kurilskiy. The centers of these regions have corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril ridge).
The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. The exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by a low-mountainous relief formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The highest peak of the Kuril Islands is the Alaid volcano - 2,339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10,339 meters. High seismicity is the reason for the constant threats of earthquakes and tsunamis.
Population -76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because the main natural wealth is the biological resources of the sea. Agriculture due to unfavorable natural conditions did not receive significant development.
Deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements indium, helium, thalium contained in them have been discovered on the Kuril Islands; there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a fairly high sulfur content have been discovered.
Transport links are carried out by sea and air. Regular shipping stops in winter. Due to difficult meteorological conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).
Discovery of the Kuril Islands
In the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639 a“ policy of self-isolation ”was declared. On pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Foreign ships were almost not allowed into the ports. " Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuriles by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.
V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks, led by Moskvitin, left Yakutsk and made the most difficult passage along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya river, to the Sea of Okhotsk. The first Russian settlements (including Okhotsk) were founded here ”.
The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to walk along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643, at the end of the summer of 1644 Poyarkov's detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. In early September, the Cossacks first saw the Amur estuary. From here, the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they got the idea of as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov the "discoverer of Sakhalin", despite the fact that the members of the expedition did not even visit its shores.
Since then, the Amur has acquired great importance, not only as a "bread river", but also as a natural communication. Indeed, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the fall of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived at the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a great military force.
The development of events steadily led to the fact that the Russian people in the second half of the 17th century could well gain a foothold in Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new turn in history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.
Being in a state of war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the required number of people and funds to successfully counter the Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomatic means have not been successful. In 1689, the Peace of Nerchinsk was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible for them.
For China, the fact of the "first discovery" of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.
Here, of course, the question arises: why did the Chinese not take advantage of such a favorable situation, did not colonize Primorye, Priamurye, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878 Chinese women were forbidden to cross the Great Chinese wall! And in the absence of "their fair half," the Chinese could not firmly settle in these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from local peoples. "
With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Peace Treaty, the sea route remained the most convenient road to Sakhalin for the Russian people. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean became regular.
In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky make expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they receive detailed information about most of the Kuriles and about the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin, by order of Peter I, survey the northern part of the Great Kuril Ridge to the Simushir Island and draw up a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.
In the 18th century, the rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people took place.
“Thus,” notes V. Shishchenko, “by the middle of the 18th century, an amazing situation had developed. Sailors different countries literally plowed the ocean up and down. A Great Wall, the Japanese "policy of self-isolation" and the inhospitable Sea of Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island out of the reach of both European and Asian researchers. "
At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuril Islands took place. In the first half of the 18th century, the Kuril Islands were actively explored by the Russians. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and South Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing on Hokkaido was made. At that time, the Russian state could not yet take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the aborigines, who sometimes resembled robbery and atrocities.
In 1779, by her highest order, Catherine II freed the "furry smokers" from any fees and forbade any encroachment on their territory. The Cossacks could not maintain their power without force, and the islands south of Urup were abandoned by them. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place with the aim of establishing trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to procrastinate and strengthen their position in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.
In 1798, a major Japanese expedition to Iturup Island took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juz. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars were installed with the inscription: "Dainihon Erotofu" (Iturup is the possession of Japan). The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens the sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzо visits Kunashir.
In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they erected their posts and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.
Thus, by the end of the 18th century, the Europeans' ideas about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.
Kuril Islands in the 19th century
In the 18th - early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian researchers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, I. F. Kruzenshtern.
Attempts by Japan to seize the Kuril Islands by force provoked protests from the Russian government. Arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations, N.P. Rezanov, declared to the Japanese that "... to the north of Matsmai (Hokkaido) all the lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not extend their possessions further."
However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. Moreover, in addition to the Kuriles, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.
In 1853, a representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.
Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin's mission was to formalize an agreement on the border between Russia and Japan.
Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant areas of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan. "
After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Shimoda Treaty, according to which it was established that "the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup", and Sakhalin was declared "undivided" between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup retreated to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.
N.I. Tsimbayev describes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century as follows: "Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II, for a long time determined Russia's policy in the Far East, which was careful and balanced."
In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for the recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)
The fact of the Japanese attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan."
Results of the Russo-Japanese War
As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in the national economic turnover. “Changing the situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, - connected with the construction of the Siberian railway, the construction of which began in 1891. It was planned to be carried out in the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world. "
By the beginning of the XX century. the main knot of international contradictions for Russia has become the Far East and the most important area - relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not strive for it. In 1902 and 1903. Intensive negotiations took place between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which led nowhere.
On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28, Japan declared war on Russia. Japan's perfidy caused a storm of indignation in Russia.
A war was imposed on Russia, which she did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The reasons for general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones were:
- incomplete military-strategic training of the armed forces;
- considerable remoteness of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the army and command;
- extreme limited network of communication links.
The hopelessness of the war was clearly manifested by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the fortress of Port Arthur in Russia on December 20, 1904, few people believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. Initial patriotic enthusiasm gave way to despondency and irritation.
A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of torpor; no one could have guessed that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short-lived, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. For a long time, Emperor Nicholas II did not agree to admit the Far Eastern failure, believing that these were only temporary failures and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He undoubtedly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, such that only a strong geopolitical position could provide, and it was seriously shaken by military failures. "
By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation is possible only in the distant future, and in the near future it is necessary to immediately begin a peaceful resolution of the conflict that has arisen. This was forced not only by considerations of a military-strategic nature, but, to an even greater extent, by complications of the internal situation in Russia.
N.I. Tsimbayev states: "Japan's military victories turned it into a leading Far Eastern power, supported by the governments of England and the United States."
The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the absence of previously worked out conditions for a possible agreement with Japan.
Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, left for the USA, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation only received instructions not to agree to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to concede "an inch of Russian land", although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.
Japan initially took a tough stance in Portsmouth, demanding in an ultimatum form Russia a complete withdrawal from Korea and Manchuria, the transfer of the Russian Far Eastern fleet, payment of indemnity and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.
The negotiations were on the verge of collapse several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation was it possible to achieve a positive result: on August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.
In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in South Manchuria, a part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov says about the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements have become an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. They looked a lot like an agreement between equal partners, and not like a treaty concluded after an unsuccessful war. "
Thus, after the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the exchange agreement of 1875, and also stated that all trade agreements between Japan and Russia were canceled as a result of the war.
This treaty annulled the Simod Treaty of 1855.
However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed back in the 1920s. Yu. Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary democratic state, a“ buffer ”between the RSFSR and Japan. The People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far East Republic under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, NRA units entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the "buffer" republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from where the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR. "
By the time of the conclusion of January 20, 1925, the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan, in fact, there was no valid bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.
In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Beijing Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, which was captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government gave Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of oil fields.
War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference
Yu. Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “... a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war between the USSR and militarist Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations undertaken at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan ... the millionth Kwantung army, which was in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army was the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.
It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to the most severe losses for them. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand prisoners. Japan lost the largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and the most powerful army. Soviet troops drove the Japanese out of Manchuria and Korea, from South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was unable to conduct an armed struggle. "
At the Yalta conference, the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe" was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands, which were part of the Japanese "northern territories" (Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai Islands).
In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan made no territorial claims to the Soviet Union. The advancement of such demands was excluded then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to comply with all decisions taken by the Allied Powers, including decisions concerning its boundaries. It was during this period that new borders between Japan and the USSR were formed.
The transformation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to the amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuriles were incorporated into the Yuzhno-Sakhalin Oblast of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document that fixed Japan's renunciation of its rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed by it in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.
In the text of this document, summing up the results of World War II, in paragraph "C" in Article 2 it was clearly written: "Japan renounces all rights, legal grounds and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and adjacent islands, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth dated September 5, 1905 ”.
However, already in the course of the San Francisco conference, the desire of Japanese government circles was revealed to question the legitimacy of the borders that developed between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism. At the conference itself, this desire did not find open support from its other participants, and above all from the Soviet delegation, which is evident from the text of the treaty cited above.
Nevertheless, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago under Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai is actually five small islands adjacent to one another). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes and then open support of the above-mentioned territorial claims to our country, which the US government circles began to provide to Japan - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta Agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.
According to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the context of the further strengthening of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to view Japan as its main military foothold in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain the dominant position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more tightly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in gaining the southern Kuriles, although such support represented a departure of the United States from the above-mentioned international agreements designed to consolidate the borders that emerged as a result of World War II. "
Many benefits were given to the Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union by the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty along with other allied countries participating in the conference. This refusal was motivated by Moscow's disagreement with the US intention to use the treaty to preserve American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union's signature on the peace treaty freed Japan from observing it.
The leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in subsequent years resorted to arguments in their statements, the essence of which boiled down to the fact that since the representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, then the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the world community should not give consent to The Soviet Union the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan renounced these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.
At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the treaty of mentioning who would continue to own these islands.
Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... the refusal of Japan from the Kuril southern islands Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan ... does not consider these islands to be Kuril. And that, by signing the treaty, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuriles, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. "
However, at the first glance at the Japanese pre-war maps and sailing directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit called "Tishima".
I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco conference to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of the peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very annoying political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to run counter to the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other to find ways to formally settle their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as at first it seemed, by both sides in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, which began in London in June 1955 at the level of the ambassadors of both countries.
However, as it turned out during the negotiations that had begun, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the interest of the Soviet Union in normalizing relations with Japan in order to obtain territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was about the open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco peace treaty in that part of it, where the northern borders of Japan were determined.
From that moment, as I.A. Latyshev, the most unfortunate territorial dispute between the two countries, which was detrimental to the Soviet-Japanese good-neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles took the path of illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders that developed between the two countries as a result of World War II.
What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.
One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control over the sea waters surrounding the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest in fish resources, as well as in other seafood, in the Pacific Ocean. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide fabulous profits for Japanese fishing and other companies, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest areas of sea fishing for themselves.
Another motive for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuril Islands under their control was the understanding by the Japanese of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: the one who owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gates leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Okhotsk.
Thirdly, putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments in broad strata of the Japanese population and to use nationalist slogans to rally these strata under their ideological control.
And finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the ruling circles of Japan to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fully fit into the militant course of the US government, directed with its spearhead against the Soviet Union, the PRC and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State DF Dulles, as well as other influential US politicians, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.
As for the Soviet side, the advancement of territorial demands by Japan was viewed by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders that developed between the two countries as a result of World War II. Therefore, Japanese demands could not but meet with resistance from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years strove to establish good-neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.
The territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev
In the course of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956 these negotiations were transferred from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having met firmly rebuffed their claims to South Sakhalin and the entire Kuril Islands, quickly began to moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese was reduced to a demand for the transfer to Japan of only the southern Kuriles, namely the islands of Kunashira, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, representing the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.
On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, short-sightedness was also revealed in the approach to the Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which was striving at any cost to accelerate the normalization of relations with Japan. Lacking a clear idea of the southern Kuriles, and even more so of their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them like a small change. Only this can explain the appearance of the Soviet leader's naive judgment that negotiations with Japan can be successfully completed if the Soviet side only needs to make a "small concession" to Japanese demands. In those days, N.S. It seemed to Khrushchev that, imbued with gratitude for the "gentlemanly" gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same "gentlemanly" compliance, namely: remove its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end in an "amicable agreement" to the mutual pleasure of both parties.
Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet negotiating delegation, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede two southern islands of the Kuril ridge to Japan: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Having readily acknowledged this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to stubbornly seek the transfer of all four South Kuril islands to it. But then she did not manage to bargain for big concessions.
Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations" signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “... agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. " ...
The transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan in the future was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's readiness to give up part of its territory in the name of good relations with Japan. It is no coincidence, as was repeatedly emphasized in the future, that the article was about the "transfer" of these islands to Japan, and not about their "return", as the Japanese side was inclined to interpret the essence of the matter at that time.
The word "transfer" was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede to Japan a part of its territory, not Japanese territory.
However, the fixation in the declaration of Khrushchev's reckless promise to give Japan an advance "gift" in the form of a part of Soviet territory was an example of the political folly of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither the legal nor the moral right to turn the country's territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The shortsightedness of this promise became evident in the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy took a course towards strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan's independent role in the Japanese-American "security treaty", the tip of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.
Nor were the hopes of the Soviet leadership justified that its readiness to "hand over" the two islands to Japan would induce Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country.
The very first months after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.
Soon, Japan had a new "argument" in territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the said declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this "argument" boiled down to the fact that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, presupposes further negotiations on the "territorial issue" does not draw a line to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, presupposes the continuation of this dispute over the other two islands of the southern Kuriles: Kunashiru and Iturupu.
Moreover, in the late 1950s, the Japanese government became more active than before using the so-called "territorial issue" to inflate the Japanese population against Russia.
All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to make adjustments to their assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not correspond to the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Soon after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed an anti-Soviet "security treaty" in Washington on January 19, 1960, on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.
The note stated that as a result of the conclusion of a military treaty by Japan, which weakened the foundations of peace in the Far East, "... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan"; "By agreeing to the transfer of these islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty," the note further said, "the Soviet government met Japan's wishes, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peaceful intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations."
As indicated later in the cited note, given the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot help to expand the territory used by foreign troops by transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan belonging to the USSR to Japan. Foreign troops in the note meant the US military, whose indefinite presence in the Japanese islands was secured by a new "security treaty" signed by Japan in January 1960.
In the following months of 1960, other notes and statements of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, indicating the unwillingness of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations over Japanese territorial claims. Since that time, for a long time, or rather more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding Japan's territorial claims has become extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in relations between the two countries” because this issue has already been “resolved” by previous international agreements.
Japanese claims 1960-1980
The firm and clear position of the Soviet side with respect to Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60s and 80s none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to involve the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders in any detailed discussion of Japanese territorial harassment. ...
But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side had come to terms with the Soviet Union's refusal to further conduct discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of the Japanese government circles were aimed at using various administrative measures to deploy the so-called "movement for the return of the northern territories" in the country.
It is noteworthy that the words "northern territories" acquired a very elastic content in the course of the development of this "movement".
Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by the "northern territories" the four southern islands of the Kuril ridge; others, including the Socialist and Communist Parties of Japan - all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of ultra-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.
Beginning in 1969, the government's cartographic department and the Ministry of Education began publicly "correcting" maps and textbooks, in which the southern Kuril Islands began to be painted in the color of Japanese territory, as a result of which the territory of Japan on these new maps "grew", as the press reported , 5 thousand square kilometers.
More and more efforts were used to process public opinion in the country and involve as many Japanese people as possible in the "movement for the return of the northern territories". So, for example, trips to the island of Hokkaido in the area of the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands, and specialized groups of tourists from other regions of the country are clearly visible, began to be widely practiced. In the programs of these groups' stay in the city of Nemuro, they included “walks” on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril ridge with the aim of “sad contemplation” of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the beginning of the 1980s, a significant proportion of the participants in these "nostalgic walks" were schoolchildren, for whom such trips were counted as "study trips" provided for in school programs. At Cape Nosapu, which is closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, a whole complex of buildings intended for "pilgrims" was built with funds from the government and a number of public organizations, including a 90-meter observation tower and the "Archival Museum" with a tendentiously selected exposition designed to convince the uninformed visitors of the alleged historical "validity" of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.
A new moment in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to draw the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Later, in the 70s and 80s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made more than once.
Since 1980, at the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called "Northern Territories Days" have been celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 that a Russian-Japanese treatise was signed in the Japanese city of Shimode, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands fell into the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.
The choice of this date as the "day of the northern territories" was to emphasize that the Shimoda Treaty (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) ostensibly to this day retains its significance.
Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose their former firmness during the period of M.S. Gorbachev. Public statements called for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that emerged as a result of World War II and for an immediate end to the territorial dispute with Japan through a “just compromise,” which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the mouth of the people's deputy, the rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yuri Afanasyev, who during his stay in Tokyo announced the need to break the Yalta system and the speedy transfer of four southern islands of the Kuril ridge to Japan.
Following Y. Afanasyev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. Nothing less than a course of gradual, protracted concessions to Japanese territorial claims was, in particular, the "Program for a Five-Stage Solution of the Territorial Question," put forward by the then leader of the interregional group, Yeltsin, during his January 1990 visit to Japan.
As IA Latyshev writes: “The result of long and tense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was a“ Joint Statement ”signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected the inconsistency characteristic of Gorbachev in his views and in the defense of the state's national interests.
On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the Joint Statement of any formulations openly confirming the Soviet side's readiness to hand over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. He also did not agree to abandon the notes of the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.
However, on the other hand, rather ambiguous formulations were included in the text of the Joint Statement, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor. "
Evidence of Gorbachev's inconsistency and hesitation in defending the national interests of the USSR was also his declaration of the Soviet leadership's intention to begin to reduce the ten thousandth military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were deployed. "Self-defense forces".
Democratic time of the 90s
The events of August 1991 in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal from the Soviet Union of the three Baltic countries, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya agreements, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening the ability of our country to resist the claims of Japan.
In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin's arrival in Japan, October 11, 1993, was finally agreed, the Tokyo press also began to orient the Japanese public to abandon excessive hopes for a quick solution to the territorial dispute with Russia.
The events associated with the further stay of Yeltsin at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the failure of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and the foreign ministry leaders of Russia for the possibility of a quick solution of the protracted dispute between the two countries through a "compromise" involving the concession of our country to the Japanese territorial harassment.
Subsequent in 1994-1999. the discussions of Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, bring anything new to the situation that developed in the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.
In other words, in 1994-1999, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse, and neither side could see a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to abandon its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became even less likely under the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and outside it than in previous years.
A clear confirmation of this was the increased frequency of conflicts in the sea waters washing the southern Kuriles - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, repeated unceremonious incursions by Japanese poachers into the territorial waters of Russia met with a tough rebuff from Russian border guards who opened fire on border violators.
I.A. Latyshev: “First, the Russian leadership should have immediately abandoned the illusion that Russia should only cede the southern Kuriles to Japan, as ... the Japanese side will immediately bless our country with large investments, and soft loans, and scientific and technical information. It was this delusion that prevailed in Yeltsin's entourage. "
“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, our diplomats and politicians both in Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's times should have abandoned the false judgment that Japanese leaders could in the near future moderate their claims to the southern Kuriles and make some "reasonable compromise" in the territorial dispute with our country.
Over the years, as discussed above, the Japanese side has never shown, and was unable to show in the future, the desire to renounce its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands. " The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demanded not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Habomai and Shikotan), and then, after a while, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).
“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats for the possibility of persuading the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, on the basis of the 1956 Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations, were self-deceiving. It was a good delusion and nothing more. " The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and intelligible confirmation of the obligation recorded in Article 9 of the named declaration to transfer to it upon the conclusion of a peace treaty the islands of Shikotan and Habomai. But this did not at all signify the readiness of the Japanese side to end, after such confirmation, its territorial harassment of our country. Japanese diplomats viewed the establishment of control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to mastering all four South Kuril islands.
In the second half of the 1990s, Russia's national interests demanded that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and vice versa, would inspire the Japanese side with the idea of the inviolability of the post-war borders of Russia.
In the fall of 1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry put forward a proposal on "joint economic development" by Russia and Japan of the very four islands of the Kuril archipelago, which Japan so insistently claimed, was nothing more than another concession to the pressure of the Japanese side.
The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuriles to a certain special zone accessible for entrepreneurial activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the "validity" of Japanese claims to these islands.
I.A. Latyshev writes: “It's also a shame: in the Russian proposals, which assumed wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kurils, there was not even an attempt to condition this access by Japan’s consent to appropriate benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory of the regions of the Japanese island of Hokkaido close to the southern Kurils. And this showed the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve in negotiations with the Japanese side equality of the two countries in their business activity in the territories of each other. In other words, the idea of "joint economic development" of the southern Kuriles turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to conquer these islands. "
The Japanese were allowed to pre-emptively fish in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands to which Japan claimed and is still claiming. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant the Russian fishing vessels similar rights to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations for its citizens and ships to comply with the fishing laws and regulations in force in Russian waters.
Thus, the ten-year attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a "mutually acceptable basis" and sign a bilateral peace treaty between the two countries did not lead to any tangible results. The resignation of B. Yeltsin and the arrival of V.V. Putin was alarmed by the Japanese public.
President of the country V.V. Putin is in fact the only state person authorized by the Constitution to determine the course of Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute between the two countries. Its powers were limited by some articles of the Constitution, and in particular those that obliged the president to “ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory” of the Russian Federation (Article 4), “to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state” (Article 82).
In late summer 2002, during his brief sojourn in the Far East, where Putin flew to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the Russian president made only a few words about his country's territorial dispute with Japan. At a meeting with journalists in Vladivostok on August 24, he said that "Japan considers the southern Kuriles to be its territory, while we consider them to be our territory."
At the same time, he expressed his disagreement with the alarming reports of some Russian media that Moscow is ready to "return" the named islands to Japan. "These are just rumors," he said, "spread by those who would like to get some benefit from this."
The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Moscow took place in accordance with the previously reached agreements on January 9, 2003. However, Putin's negotiations with Koizumi did not make any progress in the development of the territorial dispute between the two countries. I.A. Latyshev calls the policy of V.V. Putin is indecisive and evasive, and this policy gives rise to the Japanese public to expect a solution to the dispute in favor of their country.
The main factors that must be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands:
- the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
- underdeveloped infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of own vehicles to provide freight and passenger transportation;
- proximity and practically unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
- the need to save a unique natural complex Kuril Islands, maintaining local energy balance while maintaining the purity of the air and water basins, protecting the unique flora and fauna. The opinion of the local civilian population should be taken into account when developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands. Those who stay should be guaranteed all rights (including property rights), and those who leave should be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to perceive the change in the status of these territories.
The Kuril Islands are of great geopolitical and military-strategic importance for Russia and affect the national security of Russia. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of the Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. In addition, in the South Kurils there is a powerful air defense system and radar complexes, fuel depots for refueling aircraft. The Kuril Islands and the adjacent water area are a unique ecosystem with the richest natural resources, primarily biological.
The coastal waters of the South Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitats for valuable commercial fish and seafood species, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the Kuril Islands economy.
It should be noted that at the moment Russia and Japan have signed a program of joint economic development of the South Kuril Islands. The program was signed in Tokyo in 2000 during an official visit to Japan by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands of the Sakhalin region (1994-2005)" in order to ensure the comprehensive socio-economic development of this region as a special economic zone.
Japan believes that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia is impossible without determining the ownership of the four South Kuril Islands. This was stated by the head of the Foreign Ministry of this country, Yoriko Kawaguchi, speaking to the public in Sapporo with a speech on Russian-Japanese relations. The Japanese threat hanging over the Kuril Islands and their population worries the Russian people today.
"these territories are not part of the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty."
Pars pro toto. The whole cannot be equal to the part. ... encourage us - dangerously - to mistake parts for the whole. " Japan did not renounce the North. Smoked, but from the Kuriles. San Francisco Treaty 1951 8 Septembeer. Chapter II. Territory. Article 2. (c) "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, ... Japan renounces rights, legal grounds and claims to the Kurile Islands, ..." 02/16/11 The world in our time: Russian anti-aircraft missiles in the Kuriles ("Commentary Magazine", USA) JE Dyer PJ Crowley made it equally clear that the treaty does not apply to defense of the Kuril Islands, because the islands are “not under Japanese administration.” J. Crowley just as clearly indicated that the treaty does not apply to the defense of the Kuril Islands, since they are `` not under Japanese rule ''.
If jap. the tops look at the San Francisco Treaty and see after the words "Yap-ya renounces" instead of the real 4 hieroglyphs "Chishima retto" (Kurile Archipelago, Kuriles) 4 virtual "Hoppo no Chishima" (Northern Kuriles), then what can to be a CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS?
All the Kuril Islands were and are called in Japanese by the same name, sounds approximately like “Chishima”, which translates as “1000 islands”. The South Kurils are called “Minami Chishima” or “South Chishima”. In the description to the modern revisionist map of the Nemuro Sub-Prefecture, where they painstakingly brought in the South Kuril Islands. a combination of the characters “Minami Chishima” is used. Moreover, in international documents, in particular in Memorandum 677 (as a separate clause, among others, which took the Kuriles out of the sovereignty of Japan), the English transcription of Chishima was used, that is, all the Kuriles.
It is funny and sad at the same time! Yap-I look like a pissed off husband. who discovered after the divorce that he was denied access to the body.
If you say PAS clearly in the game, you will not be able to get involved in a new game! Japan itself abdicated in San Francisco in 1951. If the mother sends the child to an orphanage and signs a notarized waiver of the child, then what business does the person wanting to adopt to the point that he did not witness the signing of the waiver? The same goes for divorce. How many husbands married to ex-divorced wives witnessed the formalization of that divorce?
These are ours, in Japan, in the Russian Federation, God forgive me, jurists. RIGHT clearly distinguishes between property `` lost (and newly acquired) '' and `` GONE ''. When property is lost, the law provides that the loss was accidental and against the will of the owner. Found someone else's property cannot be appropriated and must be returned to the owner in due course. On the contrary, when the owner voluntarily parted with his property, the law asserts that the property does not belong to anyone, anyone, and, therefore, not only the aforementioned property passes to the FIRST person who takes possession of it, but also all rights to its maintenance and use them. Claims to the San Francisco Treaty are groundless, since for the Anglo-Saxons the rights of the USSR were self-evident. Japan renounced Kurile (not North-ern Kurile, jap. Chishima (not Hoppo no Chishima) out of second thought, 6 years after the war. What else do you need a FORMULA OF DISCLAIMER?
The Kuril Islands problem
Segorskikh A.
group 03 History
The so-called "disputed territories" include the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai (the Small Kuril ridge consists of 8 islands).
Usually when discussing a problem disputed territories consider three groups of problems: historical parity in the discovery and development of the islands, the role and significance of the Russian-Japanese treaties of the 19th century, which established the border between the two countries, as well as the legal force of all documents regulating the post-war world order. It is especially interesting in this matter that all the historical treaties of the past, to which Japanese politicians refer, lost their force in today's disputes, not even in 1945, but back in 1904, with the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, because international law says: a state of war between states terminates all and all treaties between them. For this reason alone, the entire "historical" layer of the argument of the Japanese side has nothing to do with the rights of today's Japanese state. Therefore, we will not consider the first two problems, but dwell on the third.
The very fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan." After the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the exchange agreement of 1875, and also stated that all trade agreements between Japan and Russia were canceled as a result of the war. This annulled the Simodan Treaty of 1855. Thus, by the time of the conclusion on January 20, 1925. Convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan, in fact, there was no valid bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.
The question of restoring the USSR's rights to the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was discussed in November 1943. at the Tehran Conference of the Heads of the Allied Powers. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945. the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain finally agreed that after the end of the Second World War, South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands would pass to the Soviet Union, and this was a condition for the USSR to enter the war with Japan - three months after the end of the war in Europe.
February 2, 1946 followed by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which established that all the land with its bowels and waters on the territory of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands is state property of the USSR.
On September 8, 1951, 49 states signed a peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco. The draft treaty was prepared during the Cold War without the participation of the USSR and in violation of the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet side proposed to carry out demilitarization and ensure the democratization of the country. The USSR, and with it Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign the treaty. Nevertheless, article 2 of this treaty states that Japan waives all rights and title to Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. Thus, Japan itself renounced its territorial claims to our country, backing it up with its signature.
But later, the United States began to assert that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not indicate in whose favor Japan renounced these territories. This laid the foundation for territorial claims.
1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Soviet side agrees to cede the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan and proposes to sign a Joint Declaration. The declaration assumed first the conclusion of a peace treaty and only then the "transfer" of the two islands. The transfer is an act of goodwill, a willingness to dispose of one's own territory "in accordance with the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state." Japan, on the other hand, insists that "return" preceded a peace treaty, because the very concept of "return" is a recognition of the illegality of their belonging to the USSR, which is a revision not only of the very results of World War II, but also of the principle of the inviolability of these results. American pressure played a role and the Japanese refused to sign a peace treaty on our terms. The subsequently concluded security treaty (1960) between the United States and Japan made it impossible to transfer Shikotan and Habomai to Japan. Our country, of course, could not give the islands for American bases, as well as bind itself with any obligations to Japan in the Kuril Islands.
On January 27, 1960, the USSR announced that, since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the issue of transferring these islands to Japan, as this would lead to an expansion of the territory used by American troops.
Currently, the Japanese side claims that the islands of Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and the Habomai ridge, which have always been Japanese territory, are not part of the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned. The US government on the scope of the "Kuril Islands" concept in the San Francisco Peace Treaty stated in official document: "They do not include, and there was no intention to include (in the Kuril Islands) the Habomai and Shikotan, or Kunashir and Iturup ranges, which were previously always part of Japan proper and, therefore, should be rightly recognized as being under Japanese sovereignty."
A worthy answer about territorial claims to us on the part of Japan was given in his time: "The borders between the USSR and Japan should be considered as the result of the Second World War."
In the 90s, when meeting with the Japanese delegation, he also strongly opposed the revision of the borders, stressing that the borders between the USSR and Japan were "legal and legally grounded." Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the question of belonging to the southern group of the Kuril Islands Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Habomai (in the Japanese interpretation - the question of "northern territories") remained the main stumbling block in Japanese-Soviet (later Japanese-Russian) relations.
In 1993, the Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese relations was signed, which states that Russia is the successor of the USSR and that all agreements signed between the USSR and Japan will be recognized by Russia and Japan.
On November 14, 2004, on the eve of the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Japan, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, recognizes the 1956 Declaration as existing and is ready to conduct territorial negotiations with Japan on its basis. This formulation of the question caused a lively discussion among Russian politicians. Vladimir Putin supported the position of the Foreign Ministry, stipulating that Russia "will fulfill all the obligations it has assumed" only "to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill these agreements." Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi said in response that Japan is not satisfied with the transfer of only two islands: "If the ownership of all the islands is not determined, the peace treaty will not be signed." At the same time, the Japanese prime minister promised to show flexibility in determining the timing of the transfer of the islands.
On December 14, 2004, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed his readiness to assist Japan in resolving the dispute with Russia over the South Kuriles. Some observers see this as a rejection of US neutrality in the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute. Yes, and a way to divert attention from their actions at the end of the war, as well as to maintain the equality of forces in the region.
During the Cold War, the United States supported Japan's position in the dispute over the South Kuriles and did everything to ensure that this position did not soften. It was under pressure from the United States that Japan reconsidered its attitude to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese declaration and began to demand the return of all disputed territories. But at the beginning of the 21st century, when Moscow and Washington found a common enemy, the United States stopped making any statements about the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute.
On August 16, 2006, a Japanese fishing schooner was detained by Russian border guards. The schooner refused to obey the commands of the border guards, warning fire was opened on it. During the incident, one member of the schooner's crew was fatally wounded in the head. This provoked a sharp protest from the Japanese side. Both sides claim that the incident took place in their own territorial waters. This is the first recorded death in 50 years of dispute over the islands.
December 13, 2006 The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Aso, at a meeting of the foreign policy committee of the lower house of representatives of parliament, spoke in favor of dividing the southern part of the disputed Kuril Islands with Russia in half. There is a point of view that in this way the Japanese side hopes to solve a long-standing problem in Russian-Japanese relations. However, immediately after the statement of Taro Aso, the Japanese Foreign Ministry disavowed his words, stressing that they had been misinterpreted.
Of course, Tokyo's position on Russia has undergone some changes. She abandoned the principle of "the indivisibility of politics and economics," that is, the rigid linking of the territorial problem with economic cooperation. Now the Japanese government is trying to pursue a flexible policy, which means soft promotion of both economic cooperation and a solution to the territorial problem.
The main factors that need to be considered when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands
· The presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
· Underdeveloped infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the practical absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger traffic;
· Proximity and practically unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region; the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, to maintain local energy balance while maintaining the purity of the air and water basins, to protect the unique flora and fauna. The opinion of the local civilian population should be taken into account when developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands. Those who stay should be guaranteed all rights (including property rights), and those who leave should be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to perceive the change in the status of these territories.
The Kuril Islands are of great geopolitical and military-strategic importance for Russia and affect the national security of Russia. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of the Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. The Kuril Islands and the adjacent water area are the only ecosystem of its kind, possessing the richest natural resources, primarily biological. The coastal waters of the South Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitats for valuable commercial fish and seafood species, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the Kuril Islands economy.
The principle of the inviolability of the results of World War II should be taken as the basis for a new stage in Russian-Japanese relations, and the term "return" should be forgotten. But maybe it is worth letting Japan create a museum of military glory on Kunashir, from which the Japanese pilots bombed Pearl Harbor. Let the Japanese often remember what the Americans did to them in response, and about the US base in Okinawa, but they feel the Russians' tribute to the former enemy.
Notes:
1. Russia and the problem of the Kuril Islands. Defending tactics or surrender strategy. Narochnitskaya N. http: /// analit /
3. The Kuriles are also Russian land. Maksimenko M. http: /// analit / sobytia /
4. Russia and the problem of the Kuril Islands. Defending tactics or surrender strategy. Narochnitskaya N. http: /// analit /
7. Modern Japanese historians about the development of the South Kuril Islands (early XVII - early XIX century) http: // proceedings. /
8. The Kuriles are also Russian land. Maksimenko M. http: /// analit / sobytia /
KURILE ISLANDSURUP
ITURUP
KUNASHIR
SHIKOTAN
T
The territory of the disputed islands of the Kuril archipelago.
emperor?
].
itself
KURILE ISLANDS- a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (USSR) and about. Hokkaido (Japan); separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. They are part of the Sakhalin Region (Russian Federation). The length is about 1200 km. The area is about 15.6 thousand km2. They consist of two parallel ridges of islands - Big Kuril and Small Kuril (Shikotan, Habomai, etc.).
The Great Kuril ridge is divided into 3 groups: southern (Kunashir, Iturup, Urup, etc.), middle (Simushir, Ketoy, Ushishir, etc.) and northern (Lovushki, Shiashkotan, Onekotan, Paramushir, etc.). Most of the islands are mountainous (height 2339 m). About 40 active volcanoes; hot mineral springs, high seismicity. On the southern islands there are forests; the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation. Fishing for fish (chum salmon, etc.) and sea animals (seal, sea lion, etc.).
URUP, an island in the Kuril Islands group, the territory of the Russian Federation. OK. 1.4 thousand km2. Consists of 25 volcanoes connected by bases. Height up to 1426 m. 2 active volcanoes (Trident and Berga).
ITURUP, the largest in area (6725 km2) island in the Kuril Islands group (Russian Federation, Sakhalin Region). Volcanic massif (height up to 1634 m). Bamboo thickets, spruce-fir forests, elfin trees. On Iturup - Kurilsk.
KUNASHIR, an island in the Kuril Islands group. OK. 1550 km2. Height up to 1819 m. Active volcanoes (Tyatya and others) and hot springs. Pos. Yuzhno-Kurilsk. Kurilskiy reserve.
SHIKOTAN, most big Island in the Small Kuril ridge. 182 km2. Height up to 412 m. Settlements- Malokurilskoe and Krabozavodskoe. Fishing. Extraction of marine animals.
The territory of the disputed islands of the Kuril archipelago.
Borders between Russia and Japan in the Kuril Islands region.
Russian navigators Captain Spanberg and Lieutenant Walton in 1739 were the first Europeans to open the way to the eastern shores of Japan, visited japanese islands Hondo (Honshu) and Matsmae (Hokkaido), described the Kuril ridge and mapped all the Kuril Islands and the eastern coast of Sakhalin. The expedition found that under the rule of the Japanese Khan [ emperor?] there is only one island of Hokkaido, the rest of the islands are beyond its control. Since the 60s, interest in the Kurils has noticeably increased, more and more often Russian fishing vessels have come to their shores, and soon the local population (Ainu) on the islands of Urup and Iturup was brought into Russian citizenship. Merchant D. Shebalin was instructed by the Okhotsk port office to "convert the inhabitants of the southern islands into Russian citizenship and start bargaining with them." Having brought the Ainu into Russian citizenship, the Russians established winter huts and camps on the islands, taught the Ainu how to use firearms, raise livestock and grow some vegetables. Many of the Ainu converted to Orthodoxy and learned to read and write. By order of Catherine II in 1779, all levies not established by decrees from St. Petersburg were canceled. Thus, the fact of the discovery and development of the Kuril Islands by the Russians is undeniable.
Over time, the crafts in the Kuril Islands became depleted, becoming less and less profitable than those off the coast of America, and therefore by the end of the 18th century, the interest of Russian merchants in the Kuriles weakened. In Japan, by the end of the same century, interest in the Kurils and Sakhalin was just awakening, because before that the Kuriles were practically unknown to the Japanese. The island of Hokkaido - according to the testimony of the Japanese scientists themselves - was considered a foreign territory and only an insignificant part of it was inhabited and developed. In the late 70s, Russian merchants reached Hokkaido and tried to start trade with local residents... Russia was interested in purchasing food in Japan for Russian fishing expeditions and settlements in Alaska and the Pacific Islands, but it did not succeed in starting trade, since it prohibited the 1639 law on the isolation of Japan, which read: "For the future, as long as the sun shines peace, no one has the right to stick to the shores of Japan, even if he was even a messenger, and this law can never be canceled by anyone on pain of death. " And in 1788, Catherine II sent a strict order to Russian industrialists in the Kuril Islands so that they "do not touch the islands under the jurisdiction of other powers", and a year before she issued a decree on equipping a round-the-world expedition for accurate description and mapping the islands from Masmay to Kamchatka Lopatka, so that they "can all be ranked formally as the possession of the Russian state." Blyo was instructed not to allow foreign industrialists to "trade and trade in places belonging to Russia and to deal with local residents peacefully." But the expedition did not take place because of the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish war [ I mean the war of 1787-1791].
Taking advantage of the weakening of the Russian positions in the southern part of the Kuril Islands, Japanese fish traders first appear in Kunashir in 1799, the next year already in Iturup, where they destroy Russian crosses and illegally erect a pillar with a designation indicating that the islands belong to Japan. Japanese fishermen often began to come to the shores of South Sakhalin, fished, robbed the Ainu, which was the reason for frequent skirmishes between them. In 1805, Russian sailors from the frigate "Juno" and the tender "Avos" set up a pillar on the shore of Aniva Bay. Russian flag, and the Japanese camp at Iturup was ravaged. The Russians were warmly greeted by the Ainu.
In 1854, in order to establish trade and diplomatic relations with Japan, the government of Nicholas I sent Vice-Admiral E. Putyatin. His mission also included the delimitation of Russian and Japanese possessions. Russia demanded recognition of its rights to the island of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, which had long belonged to it. Knowing perfectly well what a difficult situation Russia found itself in, while simultaneously waging a war with the three powers in the Crimea, Japan put forward unfounded claims to the southern part of Sakhalin. At the beginning of 1855, in the city of Shimoda, Putyatin signed the first Russian-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship, in accordance with which Sakhalin was declared undivided between Russia and Japan, the border was established between the islands of Iturup and Urup, and the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate were opened for Russian ships and Nagasaki. The Shimoda Treatise of 1855 in Article 2 defines:
“From now on, the border between the Japanese state and Russia will be established between Iturup Island and Urup Island. The entire Iturup Island belongs to Japan, the entire Urup Island and the Kuril Islands to the north of it belong to Russia. As for the Karafuto Island (Sakhalin), it is still not divided by the border between Japan and Russia. "
In our time, the Japanese side claims that this treatise comprehensively took into account the activities of Japan and Russia in the Sakhalin region and the Kuril Islands up to the time of its conclusion and was concluded as a result of negotiations between Japan and Russia in a peaceful atmosphere. The plenipotentiary representative of the Russian side at the negotiations, Admiral Putyatin, at the signing of the treaty, said: "In order to prevent future disputes, as a result of careful study, it was confirmed that Iturup Island is Japanese territory." Documents recently published in Russia show that Nicholas I considered Urup Island to be the southern limit Russian territory.
The Japanese side considers the assertion erroneous that Japan had imposed this treatise on Russia, which was in a difficult situation during the Crimean War. It is completely contrary to the facts. At that time, Russia was one of the great European powers, while Japan was a small and weak country, which the United States, Britain and Russia were forced to abandon the country's 300-year-old policy of self-isolation.
Japan also considers erroneous the assertion that Russia allegedly has “historical rights” to the Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai ridge, confirmed by this treatise as Japanese possession, due to their discovery and expeditions. As mentioned above, both Nicholas I and Admiral E.V. Putyatin (1803-1883 +), on the basis of the then objective situation, concluded a treatise, realizing that the southern border of Russia is Urup Island, and Iturup and south of it are the territory of Japan. Since 1855, for over 90 years, neither Tsarist Russia nor the Soviet Union ever insisted on these so-called "historical rights."
There was no need for Japan to discover these islands, located at the shortest distance from it and visible from Hokkaido with the naked eye. The names of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup are recorded on a map of the Shoho era, published in Japan in 1644. Japan ruled these islands before anyone else. Actually, Japan justifies its claims to the so-called "Northern Territories" precisely by the content of the Shimoda Treatise of 1855 and by the fact that until 1946 the Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan Islands and the Habomai Ridge have always been Japanese territories and have never become Russian territories.
The government of Alexander II made the Middle East and Central Asia and, fearing to leave uncertain their relations with Japan in the event of a new aggravation of relations with England, they agreed to sign the so-called Petersburg Treaty of 1875, according to which all the Kuril Islands, in exchange for the recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. Alexander II, who had previously sold Alaska in 1867 for a symbolic and at that time amount of 11 million rubles, and this time made a major mistake by underestimating the strategic importance of the Kuriles, which were later used by Japan for aggression against Russia. The tsar naively believed that Japan would become a peaceful and calm neighbor of Russia, and when the Japanese, justifying their claims, refer to the 1875 treaty, then for some reason they forget (as G. Kunadze “forgot” today) about its first article: “.. . eternal peace and friendship between the Russian and Japanese empires will continue to be established. "
Then there was 1904, when Japan treacherously attacked Russia ... At the conclusion of the peace treaty in Portsmouth in 1905, the Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Russian side said then that this was contrary to the 1875 treaty. What did the Japanese answer to this?
- The war negates all agreements, you were defeated and let's proceed from the current situation.
It was only thanks to skillful diplomatic maneuvers that Russia managed to keep northern part Sakhalin followed, and South Sakhalin went to Japan.
At the Yalta conference of the heads of powers of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, held in February 1945, after the end of the Second World War, it was decided to transfer South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, and this was a condition for the USSR to enter the war with Japan - three months after the end of the war in Europe.
On September 8, 1951, 49 states signed a peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco. The draft treaty was prepared during the Cold War without the participation of the USSR and in violation of the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet side proposed to carry out demilitarization and ensure the democratization of the country. The representatives of the United States and Great Britain told our delegation that they had come here not to discuss, but to sign the treaty and therefore would not change a single line. The USSR, and with it Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign the treaty. And what is interesting, article 2 of this treaty states that Japan waives all rights and legal grounds to Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. So Japan itself
renounced territorial claims to our country, backing it up with her signature.
Currently, the Japanese side claims that the islands of Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and the Habomai ridge, which have always been Japanese territory, are not part of the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned. The US government, regarding the scope of the Kuril Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, stated in an official document: have always been part of Japan proper and, therefore, must be rightly recognized as being under Japanese sovereignty. "
1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Soviet side agrees to cede the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan and proposes to sign a peace treaty. The Japanese side is inclined to accept the Soviet proposal, but in September 1956, the United States sent Japan a note stating that if Japan abandons its claims to Kunashir and Iturup and is satisfied with only two islands, then the United States will not give up the Ryukyu Islands. where the main island is Okinawa. American intervention played a role and ... the Japanese refused to sign a peace treaty on our terms. The subsequently concluded security treaty (1960) between the United States and Japan made it impossible to transfer Shikotan and Habomai to Japan. Our country, of course, could not give the islands for American bases, as well as bind itself with any obligations to Japan in the Kuril Islands.
A. N. Kosygin gave a worthy answer about territorial claims to us from Japan:
- The borders between the USSR and Japan should be viewed as the result of the Second World War.
One could put an end to this, but I would like to remind you that just 6 years ago, when a delegation from the PCJ met, Mikhail Gorbachev also strongly opposed the revision of the borders, stressing that the borders between the USSR and Japan were "legitimate and legally justified." ...
Recently, Shinzo Abe announced that he would annex to Japan disputed islands South Kuril ridge. “I will solve the problem of the northern territories and conclude a peace treaty. As a politician, as a prime minister, I want to achieve this by all means, ”he promised his compatriots.
According to Japanese tradition, Shinzo Abe will have to do hara-kiri for himself if he doesn't keep his word. It is quite possible that Vladimir Putin will help the Japanese prime minister live to a ripe old age and die a natural death. Photo by Alexander Vilf (Getty Images).
In my opinion, everything goes to the fact that the long-standing conflict will be settled. The time for establishing decent relations with Japan has been chosen very well - for the empty, inaccessible lands, which are now and then nostalgically glanced at by their former owners, you can get many material benefits from one of the most powerful economies in the world. And the lifting of sanctions as a condition for the transfer of the islands is far from the only and not the main concession, which, I am sure, our Foreign Ministry is now seeking.
So the quite expected surge of quasi-patriotism of our liberals directed at the Russian president should be prevented.
I have already had to analyze in detail the history of the Tarabarov and Bolshoi Ussuriisky islands on the Amur, with the loss of which Moscow snobs cannot come to terms. The post also talked about the dispute with Norway over maritime territories, which was also settled.
I also touched on secret negotiations between human rights activist Lev Ponomarev and a Japanese diplomat about the "northern territories", filmed and posted on the Internet. Generally speaking, this one video it is enough for our caring citizens to bashfully swallow the return of the islands of Japan, if it takes place. But since caring citizens will definitely not remain silent, we must understand the essence of the problem.
Background
February 7, 1855- Treatise of Shimoda on Trade and Frontiers. The now disputed islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands were ceded to Japan (therefore, February 7 is annually celebrated in Japan as Northern Territories Day). The question of the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved.
May 7, 1875- Petersburg Treaty. The rights to all 18 Kuril Islands were transferred to Japan in exchange for the entire Sakhalin.
August 23, 1905- Portsmouth Peace Treaty on resultsRussian-Japanese War.Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin.
February 11, 1945 — Yalta conference. THE USSR, USA and UK reached a written agreement on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan, subject to the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to it after the end of the war.
February 2, 1946 on the basis of the Yalta agreements in the USSR established Yuzhno-Sakhalin Region- on the territory of the southern part of the island Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. January 2, 1947 she was merged with Sakhalin Oblast Khabarovsk Territory, which expanded to the borders of the modern Sakhalin region.
Japan enters the Cold War
September 8, 1951 in San Francisco, a Peace Treaty was signed between the Allied Powers and Japan. Regarding the currently disputed territories, it says the following: "Japan renounces all rights, legal grounds and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and adjacent islands, over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905".
The USSR sent a delegation to San Francisco headed by Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko. But not to sign a document, but to voice their position. We have formulated the mentioned clause of the agreement as follows:"Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, legal grounds and claims to these territories."
Of course, in our wording, the agreement is specific and more in line with the spirit and letter of the Yalta Agreements. However, the Anglo-American version was adopted. The USSR did not sign it, Japan did.
Today, some historians believe that The USSR was supposed to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the form in which it was proposed by the Americans- this would strengthen our negotiating position. “We should have signed a contract. I don’t know why we didn’t do it - perhaps because of vanity or pride, but above all, because Stalin overestimated his capabilities and the degree of his influence on the United States, ”N. S. wrote in his memoirs. . Khrushchev. But soon, as we will see later, he himself made a mistake.
From the standpoint of today, the absence of a signature on the notorious treaty is sometimes considered almost a diplomatic failure. However, the international situation at that time was much more complicated and was not limited to The Far East... Perhaps, what seems to someone a loss, in those conditions became a necessary measure.
Japan and sanctions
Sometimes it is mistakenly believed that since we do not have a peace treaty with Japan, then we are in a state of war. However, this is not at all the case.
December 12, 1956 A diploma exchange ceremony was held in Tokyo to mark the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. According to the document, the USSR agreed to "the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, however that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."
The parties came to this formulation after several rounds of long negotiations. Japan's initial proposal was simple: a return to Potsdam - that is, the transfer of all the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to it. Of course, such a proposal from the side that had lost the war looked somewhat frivolous.
The USSR was not going to concede an inch, but unexpectedly for the Japanese, Habomai and Shikotan suddenly proposed. This was a reserve position approved by the Politburo, but announced prematurely - the head of the Soviet delegation, Ya.A. Malik, was acutely discontent with Khrushchev because of the protracted negotiations. On August 9, 1956, during a conversation with his counterpart in the garden of the Japanese Embassy in London, the reserve position was announced. It was she who entered the text of the Joint Declaration.
It is necessary to clarify that the influence of the United States on Japan at that time was enormous (however, as it is now). They closely monitored all her contacts with the USSR and, undoubtedly, were the third party to the negotiations, albeit invisible.
At the end of August 1956, Washington threatened Tokyo that if, under a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan renounced its claims to Kunashir and Iturup, the United States would forever retain the occupied island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago. The note sounded a wording that clearly played on the national feelings of the Japanese: “The US government concluded that the Iturup and Kunashir islands (along with the Habomai and Shikotan islands, which are part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan and should fairly be treated as belonging to Japan. ". That is, the Yalta agreements were publicly disavowed.
The belonging of the "northern territories" of Hokkaido, of course, is a lie - on all military and pre-war Japanese maps, the islands have always been part of the Kuril ridge and have never been designated separately. However, the idea was to their liking. It is on this geographic absurdity that entire generations of the Land of the Rising Sun politicians have made their careers.
The peace treaty has not yet been signed - in our relations we are guided by the 1956 Joint Declaration.
The price of the issue
I think that even during the first term of his presidency, Vladimir Putin decided to settle all disputed territorial issues with his neighbors. Including Japan. In any case, back in 2004, Sergei Lavrov formulated the position of the Russian leadership: “We have always fulfilled and will continue to fulfill our obligations, especially the ratified documents, but, of course, to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements ... So far, as we know, we have not managed to come to an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as we saw in 1956 ”.
"Until Japan's ownership of all four islands is clearly determined, there will be no peace treaty," then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded. The negotiation process is again at an impasse.
However, this year we again remembered the peace treaty with Japan.
In May, at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin said that Russia was ready to negotiate with Japan on the disputed islands, and the solution should be a compromise. That is, neither side should feel like a loser “Are you ready to negotiate? Yes, we are ready. But we were surprised to hear recently that Japan has joined some kind of sanctions - and here is Japan, I don't quite understand - and is suspending the negotiation process on this topic. So we are ready, whether Japan is ready, I have not learned for myself, "- said the President of the Russian Federation.
It looks like the pain point was groped right. And the negotiation process (I hope, this time in offices tightly closed from American ears) has been in full swing for at least six months. Otherwise, Shinzo Abe would not have made such promises.
If we fulfill the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration and return the two islands to Japan, 2,100 people will have to be resettled. All of them live on Shikotan, only a frontier post is located on Habomai. Most likely, the problem of the presence of our armed forces on the islands is being discussed. However, for complete control over the region, the troops stationed on Sakhalin, Kunashir and Iturup are quite enough.
Another question is what kind of reciprocal concessions we expect from Japan. It is clear that the sanctions should be lifted - this is not even discussed. Maybe access to loans and technologies, increased participation in joint projects? It is not excluded.
Be that as it may, Shinzo Abe is faced with a difficult choice. The conclusion of the long-awaited peace treaty with Russia, flavored with "northern territories", would certainly have made him the politician of the century in his homeland. It will inevitably lead to tension in Japan's relations with the United States. I wonder what the prime minister would prefer.
And we will somehow survive the internal Russian tension that our liberals will inflate.
The Habomai group of islands is designated as "Other Islands" on this map. These are several white spots between Shikotan and Hokkaido.
____________________
